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1. Overview 
Social capital in Yemen is informed primarily by tribal affiliation, particularly in rural areas and in 
the north. Other important sources including faith based institutions, local community solidarity 
initiatives, civil society organisations and support from the diaspora. While social capital has 
been eroded due to political, social and economic changes in recent years, the strong traditions 
of community self-help and dispute mediation continue to be important for some communities 
during the current crisis. However, given the local diversity of impact, resilience and coping 
strategies, local level analyses are key to understanding social capital in individual communities. 
This rapid review has not found much literature that specifically applies the concept ‘social 
capital’1 in research or analysis on Yemen. Therefore the review has taken a wide approach to 
search for relevant literature on Yemen’s societal institutions and relations.  
There appears to be relatively limited recent in-depth research on social structures in Yemen 
(compared with the richer ethnographic literature on tribes in the North twenty or thirty years ago, 
for example
2
). However, this rapid review has found a small literature from the last decade on 
social institutions as well as patterns of exclusion and vulnerability in the country prior to the 
outbreak of the current crisis in 2015. This ranges from academic historical analyses of Yemeni 
tribes and society (e.g. Lackner, 2016; Gledhill, 2017); a focus on alternative dispute resolution 
(e.g. Gaston and al-Dawsari, 2014) and civil society intermediary organisations (Bonnefoy and 
Poirier, 2009); to social analyses by donors (e.g. the World Bank’s 2006 country social).  
Due to the current humanitarian crisis, there is limited up-to-date research and data on the 
impact of the conflict. Some of it is anecdotal (and included in this review to show the type of 
evidence and findings that are in circulation). Humanitarian mappings of communities’ needs 
help identify where social capital is under strain, while some international organisations are 
reporting on household and community coping strategies. 
The literature and experts caution against generalising about Yemen and social capital because 
of the wide variety of local dynamics. This rapid review has tried hard to identify available local 
analyses, while also reflecting literature that provides an over-arching narrative on Yemen’s 
societal institutions and their changing characteristics over time. This rapid review has identified 
a couple of relevant primary in-depth qualitative studies that ask community focus groups about 
their communities’ coping strategies, resilience and cohesion: notably by Al-Dawsari for Oxfam in 
2014 in western Yemen; by UNDP in 2015 (UNDP, 2015; 2016a,b,c); and Oxfam in 2016 
(Gressman, 2016; Moodley, 2016). More research is required in local areas to establish the 
ongoing impact of the conflict on social capital at the household and community level. 
                                                   
1
 There is no single definition of social capital. A useful definition is provided by Aldrich & Smith (2015): the 
connections and ties that bond individuals to others on a daily basis. Aldrich and Smith further categorise this into 
three different forms: Bonding social capital (between quite similar people such as family members, neighbours, 
or extended kin); bridging social capital (between individuals different in critical ways who share an institution or 
interest); and linking social capital (the vertical ties between citizens and decision makers).  
2
 It was beyond the scope of this rapid review to investigate this older body of literature. Stabilisation Unit (2012, 
p.3) identifies the following academic experts as being at the forefront of this research - Paul Dresch, Steve 
Caton, Shelagh Weir and Najwa Adra. 
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Key findings include: 
 A wide variety of local dynamics affects social capital in Yemen: generalisations 
should be avoided. Given the local diversity, local level analyses are key to 
understanding social capital in individual communities. 
 Social capital in Yemen is informed primarily by tribal affiliation, but it is also 
important to appreciate that tribes are neither homogenous nor ubiquitous. Faith 
based institutions, local community solidarity initiatives, other civil society organisations 
and support from the diaspora are other important sources of social capital. There is 
considerable interplay between the institutions informing social capital, in particular given 
the centrality of tribes to Yemeni society. 
 Social capital is affected by geography, gender and other vulnerabilities: 
o Tribal structures are strongest in rural northern highlands and weakest in south 
Yemen. However, regions are not homogenous: for example tribal dispute resolution 
is still important in some southern areas (Gaston and al-Daswari, 2014, p.3).  
o Large segments of the population do not belong to tribes and other forms of social 
organisation (e.g. belonging to a specific village or urban centre) are prevalent in a 
number of regions (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2009, p.6). 
o Women have less access to social capital than men. The traditionally marginalised – 
in particular the ethnic outcast Muhamasheen – have little or no social capital. 
 Benefits of Yemen’s community institutions include “strong traditions of deliberative 
decision making, dispute resolution mechanisms, principles for balancing private and 
collective interests for beneficial resource use, and protecting the interests of the socially 
vulnerable” (World Bank, 2015, p.82). 
 Challenges include recent political, social and economic change that has eroded 
social capital, changing patterns of exclusion and driving conflict and political instability 
(Adra, 2006, p. 4, World Bank, 2016, p.2). 
 Impact of the conflict since 2015 on social capital: communities face varied conflict 
experiences and multi-dimensional impacts. This review has found limited recent data. 
o The assessments identified by this rapid review report that social support and conflict 
resolution remain important for some communities, while others are struggling to 
respond to the impacts of the crisis (UNDP 2015; 2016a,b,c; Moodley, 2016).  
o The conflict has affected social dynamics within communities, tending to increase 
social polarisation and unequal access to social safety nets (OCHA, 2016, p.40). 
There is a fear that even if the war stops, local violent disputes will continue. Armed 
groups are becoming entrenched as powerful (but unaccountable) authorities 
(Moodley, 2016, p.8-9). 
o The most vulnerable are people affected by displacement, women, children, 
minorities, and refugees and migrants (OCHA, 2016). 
o There are reports of positive responses by women, the private sector and other local 
organisations. Humanitarian agency policy recommendations include providing 
support to women-led grassroots organisations; to local organisations’ in the 
humanitarian response, including the private sector; and establishing genuine 
community participation in local delivery of humanitarian assistance with special 
attention to women and marginalised groups. (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy et al, 2017; 
Gressman, 2016; Moodley, 2016; OCHA, 2016). 
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2. Social capital prior to the current humanitarian crisis 
Different forms of social capital in Yemen 
1) Tribal affiliation 
Often described as ‘a tribal society’, the majority of Yemen’s rural population (more than 70 per 
cent) identify as tribal members, according to a World Bank report on societal dynamics and 
fragility (Marc et al, 2013, p.111). Tribes have played an important role as an intermediary 
between state and society in Yemen in the context of a majority rural population and weak or 
absent state structures (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2009, p.6). They have been at the centre of 
political, economic, judicial and military power in rural areas in Yemen for centuries (Marc et al, 
2013, p. 98; Gledhill, 2017, p.174; Bonnefoy and Poirer, 2009: p.6; Adra, 2016, p.303). 
Yemen has never had a strong central state (Al-Iranyi et al, 2015, p. 329; Gledhill, 2017, p.164). 
Following Yemen’s 1990 unification, civil war in 1994 debilitated state structures. Political 
patronage held Yemen together under President Ali Abdullah Saleh (President for 33 years) but 
did not establish state authority throughout the country (Gledhill, 2017, p.173-174). With the 
collapse of Saleh’s regime in 2011 resource competition intensified, further weakening state 
structures (p.174). Formal justice has been mostly absent outside the main towns, and 
particularly weak in areas with a strong tribal history (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.6). (Since 
2015 the humanitarian crisis has incapacitated state services; see Section 5 for more details.) 
A 2014 qualitative primary research study on social capital in eight villages in two governates 
(Hajjah and Al Hodeida) in west Yemen found that the tribal structure, while relatively weak 
compared with the central region, was 1) still active in facilitating access to limited public services 
and 2), as in other places, played a key role in dispute resolution (Al-Dawsari, 2014). 
An important point is that tribes have not been homogenous or ubiquitous in Yemen.  There are 
significant geographical variations
3
, including between North and South, and rural and urban 
areas. There are other important non-tribal groups (Stabilisation Unit, 2012, p.1). Moreover tribal 
influence has depended on whether the tribal leader has been co-opted by the state, and what 
interests he represented (p.1). See World Bank (2006) for a more detailed account of the 
geographic characteristics of tribal institutions and historical development. 
2) Faith based institutions 
Most citizens are Muslim, belonging to Shafi-Sunni communities (65 per cent) and Zaydi-Shia 
(estimated 35 per cent of the population) (United States Department of State, 2015, p.1-2). With 
Islam the official religion and Sharia constitutionally the source of all legislation, Yemen has had 
a long history of religious moderation, with amicable relations between the two predominant 
Islamic sects and the rights of non-Muslim religious minorities
4
 generally respected in practice 
(United States Department of State, 2012, p.1; Freedom House, 2016).  
                                                   
3
 Tribes in Yemen are distinct from those in other Middle Eastern countries in that they are sedentary and 
territorial, and consanguinity is not necessarily a defining factor of membership. (Stabilisation Unit, 2012, p.1) 
4 Minorities include approximately 15,000 Ismaili Muslims are concentrated in the Haraz district near Sana’a; an 
indeterminate number of Twelver Shia (residing mainly in the north) and Sufis; as well as Jews, Bahais, Hindus, 
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World Bank (2006, p. 51) found that Yemeni “religious and cultural values are important in 
reinforcing traditional mechanisms of solidarity and resolution mechanisms by recalling principles 
of generosity, support to the weak, fairness, reconciliation and integrity”. Islamic practice and 
mutual self-help norms include the tradition of alms giving to the poor (p.51).  
Bonnefoy and Poirier (2009, p.8) find that through systems of religious taxation (‘zakat’) and 
endowments, and a dense network of mosques in Yemen as well as connections with 
transnational networks, the Islamic realm has provided welfare, education and justice. They 
found it largely decentralised and independent, with small local actors managing mosques, 
schools and Islamic courts (p.8). Religious based social networks like the female Quranic study 
groups mobilised for the Islah Charitable society or the Islah Islamist party (p.9). At the same 
time however, the central state also became a major religious actor, collecting the zakat, 
appointing imams and establishing its own network of religious educational institutions (p.8).  
3) Local community solidarity  
Experts consider Yemen to have had a “rich history of both community participation and 
grassroots-level community-based institutions”, with tribes the most prominent informal institution 
(Baas and Ali, 2005, p.8).  
From the 1970s a local vibrant cooperative movement, which started in North Yemen in the 
central region of Taez
5
 and spread out, undertaking education, health and infrastructure activities 
through mutual aid (Bonnefoy and Poirer, 2009, p.17). This lost some effectiveness during the 
1980s after being subsumed into the state’s administration (p.17). In 2006 the World Bank 
reported that there continued to be active community solidarity initiatives, from collectively 
managing water crises to collaborative labour for building and maintaining local infrastructure and 
other community assets (p.51-52). Carapico (1998) highlighted that the early activities were 
overwhelmingly financed from non-central sources, in particular by remittances. 
The national Social Fund for Development in Yemen has been widely cited as a positive example 
donor supported community driven development in a fragile environment (Gisselquist, 2015, 
p.288). It was established in 1997 to combat national poverty and reinforce the limited existing 
social safety net (Al-Iranyi et al, 2015, p.321). By 2012 the programme reached almost a quarter 
of Yemen's villages (Gisselquist, 2015, p.288). Al-Iranyi et al (2015, p.329) find that SFD 
successfully adapted to Yemen’s social and political context by giving an important role to the 
community in setting its priorities and implementing its programmes.  
There have also been successful interventions promoting social inclusion of marginalised 
populations in Sana’a City and Taiz including through collaboration among a wide number 
stakeholders: national and local government, private sector, civil society and the shanty dwellers 
themselves (World Bank, 2006, p.50).  
The literature highlights that it can be difficult to isolate a community-based organisation (CBO) 
from the tribe as a social institution; moreover CBOs have been highly vulnerable to tribal 
conflicts, depending on the local setting (Baas and Ali, 2005, p.9; Carapico, 1998).  
                                                                                                                                                              
and Christians, many of whom are refugees or temporary foreign residents, comprising less than 1 percent of the 
population (U.S. Department of State, 2015, p.1,2) 
5
 Place names are included in this report as spelt in the source material and are not standardised. 
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4) Civil society organisations 
Unification in 1990 brought greater democratic freedom and civil society – including political 
parties, free press and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – flourished before curtailment 
by the 1994 civil war (Bonnefoy and Poirer, 2009). In 2009 analysts found that Yemen was still 
characterised by “a vigorous and dynamic civil society” with about 5,000 registered NGOs. Half 
of these undertook charitable activities; the others social and cooperative work (especially in the 
agricultural sector), development issues, the promotion of democracy and human rights and 
women’s empowerment (p.10-11).  
5) Diaspora 
The Yemeni diaspora has played an important role in supporting families back home, with 
remittances a key source of income in many rural communities (World Bank, 2015, p.88). 6 to 7 
million Yemenis have settled in over 40 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, and North 
America
6
.  In particular Yemeni nationals migrated to the Gulf States – especially Saudi Arabia – 
for economic and security reasons (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2017). Officially 
estimated at around USD 3.3 billion a year, remittances accounted for 8.9 per cent of GDP in 
2015
7
 (World Bank, 2017, p.27). It is likely that additional significant remittances are transferred 
through informal networks due to the poor penetration of financial services in the country
8
.  
Factors determining type and strength of social capital 
1) Wide variety of local dynamics 
Generalisations about social capital in Yemen are difficult to make because of the wide variety of 
narrowly defined identity groups that fragment Yemeni society (Marc et al, 2013, p.52). The 
government patronage system has exacerbated these divisions by co-opting clans, religious 
groups and regional leaders, switching allegiance when necessary, creating competition between 
subgroups and a sense of incompatibility between identities (p.52). Academics studying Yemen 
tribalism recommend understanding Yemen society by looking at geography and the local 
community, rather than just the tribe (Stabilisation Unit, 2012, p.4).  
The literature provides summaries of the geographical prevalence and character of tribal 
structures
9
 (and therefore tribal social capital), and details regions’ distinct cultural and 
political histories. It is noteworthy that the literature has also stressed Yemen’s strong sense of 
national identity (World Bank, 2006, p.52). Key points include: 
 Tribal structures have been strongest in rural northern highlands and in the desert along 
the borders with Saudi Arabia, where the population historically belongs to the two major 
tribal confederations, the Hashid and Bakil (Gaston and Al-Daswari, 2014, p.3; Hales, 
                                                   
6
 http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/12/21/yemen-our-home-
innovative-online-platform-connects-yemeni-diaspora-with-local-communities-in-need.html  
7
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=YE&name_desc=true  
8
 http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/12/21/yemen-our-home-
innovative-online-platform-connects-yemeni-diaspora-with-local-communities-in-need.html  
9 See Stabilisation Unit (2012, p.6) for a geographical mapping of Yemeni tribes. 
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2010, p.5) In North Yemen (former Yemen Arab Republic), in the early 1960s, tribes were 
formally incorporated in the state structure, and up to present day provide political 
support for the central regime for political and economic benefits (Marc et al, 2013, p.99).  
 In lower uplands around Taiz and Ibb and along the Red Sea coast up through Hudeida, 
tribal traditions exist and have been dominant in some communities, but overall weaker 
than more northern areas. (Gaston and Al-Daswari, 2014, p.3) 
 Tribal structures have been weakest in south Yemen, particularly in Aden (Gaston and 
Al-Daswari, 2014, p.3). In the South (former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), 
the British colonisation minimised the role of tribes in urban areas (particularly the port 
town of Aden) and the controlling Socialist Party (1967-1989) undermined tribal 
structures to favour state mechanisms (Marc et al, 2013, p.99; Gaston and al-Dawsari 
2014, p.3). After unification in 1990, the incorporation of tribal leaders into formal 
institutions was reinforced (p.99). However, in non-tribal southern governates, tribal 
dispute resolution is still important, in particular since the formal provision has weakened 
since 2011 (Gaston and al-Dawsari, 2014, p.6). 
 Viewing Yemen as fragmented along North/South lines does not fit the complex reality 
(according to Ardemagni, 2016b in her London School of Economic blog post). The 
South is not a homogenous actor; regional and tribal identities feed local agendas. See 
Marc et al (2013, p.52-53) for further detail on regional and other identities and divisions. 
The World Bank’s 2006 country social analysis provides a regional breakdown of livelihood 
strategies (and how they are changing) across the country’s main geographic zones (rural– 
Highland, Tihama, Eastern Plateau, Arabian Sea – and strategies). While not about social capital 
per se, the geographic analysis offers some insight into communities’ different stresses and 
coping strategies. 
Urban areas: many urban Yemenis have identified with their tribal heritage and in the past may 
use tribal customs to resolve their conflicts (particularly in Sana’a, located in a predominantly 
tribal area (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.3) However, overall tribal dispute resolution has 
been less prevalent in urban areas because they tended to have some functioning formal justice 
mechanisms and other nontribal dispute resolution (such as commercial arbitration) (p.3). World 
Bank (2006, p.30) found that in urban centres patron-client ties with wealthy individuals who have 
links to the states were important, while networks of solidarity were weak, due to the stresses of 
urban life and heterogeneity of people in the towns/cities (p.31). Nevertheless in some areas 
(e.g. Yarim and Attaq) tribal solidarity networks remained strong (p.31). 
Non-tribal communities: Bonnefoy and Poirier (2009, p.6) highlight that large segments of the 
population have not belonged to tribes. Other forms of social organisation (e.g. belonging to a 
specific village or urban centre) were prevalent in a number of regions, al-Hujariyya for instance 
(p.6).  
2) Gender 
“Gender relations in Yemen are shaped by diverse religious, cultural, social and political 
traditions. They are complex, and vary across the north and south of the country, between urban 
and rural areas, and between different tribes and generations.” (Gressman, 2016, p.3).  
A key point is that “historically, women in Yemen have had much less power in society than men” 
(p.3).Yemen is a patriarchal society and tribal ideology and leadership is male dominated (Adra, 
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2016, p.316). Women’s safety nets have depended on their male relatives, and their resources 
have been limited without family support (Heinze, 2016, p.1). Al-Dawsri’s 2014 focus groups in 
western Yemen reported that women face higher barriers to accessing tribal actors (p.3). This 
situation was attenuated by rural women’s economic (agricultural) contributions as well as tribal 
egalitarian norms (Adra, 2016, p.316).  
There have been geographical differences. In the north conservative interpretations of Islam has 
limited the role of women to family affairs, and in urban areas, the seclusion of women has been 
the social ideal. In the south, socialist ideology led to two generations of highly educated and 
empowered women leaders in urban areas (particularly in the former capital Aden) (Heinze, 
2016, p.2). In 2006 the World Bank identified strong political will for addressing challenges to 
gender equity and promotion of women’s economic inclusion and political voice, with a vibrant (if 
fragmented) women’s movement (p.50). 
3) Traditionally marginalised  
The minority group Akdham (which translates as a perjorative term for ‘the servants’) – or as they 
prefer to be called, the Muhamasheen or ‘marginalised ones’ – have a distinct cultural and ethnic 
heritage from the majority Yemeni population
10
 (Marc et al, 2013, p.120). They have been 
traditionally marginalised in Yemen, socially discriminated against for centuries as inferior 
“untouchable” outcasts (p.120; All Youth Network for Community Development and International 
Dalit Solidarity Network World, 2012, p.4). Falling outside the tribal and societal structure, they 
have little access to redress or mediation (El Rajii, 2016, p.12).  
People born in Yemen of Somali ancestry also face discrimination, as do the thousands of 
refugees from the Horn of Africa who are routinely subject to theft, abuse and even murder 
(p.120; Freedom House, 2015).  
Benefits of social capital  
In 2015 the World Bank surmised that:  
“The performance of community institutions varies and is vulnerable to intervention and 
the capture of benefits by influential people, but the country has strong traditions of 
deliberative decision making, dispute resolution mechanisms, principles for 
balancing private and collective interests for beneficial resource use, and 
protecting the interests of the socially vulnerable.” (p.82) 
Benefits of tribal (and other) institutions
11
 found in the literature reviewed include: 
 Tribal culture (although often intertwined with government) is considered to have played 
a critical role in the balance of power in contemporary Yemen; preventing the 
development of an autocratic state, promoting political dialogue and consensus-building 
at the national level; and checking the escalation of violence in parts of Yemen following 
                                                   
10
 According to some, the Muhamasheen account for up to 10 per cent of the population (El Rajji, 2016, p.12).   
11
 Recent analysis highlights that tribalism in Yemen has often been misunderstood, considered ahistorically 
despite changes that have taken place over decades, and subject to multiple prejudices (Lackner, 2016, p.1).  
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the dissolution of state capacity in 2011 (Bonnefoy and Poirer, 2009, p.7; Al-Dawsari, 
2012, p.1; Gledhill, 2017). Local religious leaders have also played a role in encouraging 
peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.4).  
 The tribal system has provided structures and consistent customary laws (’urf’), 
enforced using various social sanctions, mediation and “reciprocal obligations of 
cooperation among their members (Marc et al, 2013, p.99; Gledhill, 2017, p.174; 
Bonnefoy and Poirer, 2009, p.6; Adra, 2016, p.310-11).  
 Communities have also traditionally played “a significant role in the management of 
local resources such as land and water, providing not only a basic framework of 
property rights that control access, but also rules regulating use, including rainwater 
harvesting, grazing, and irrigation” (World Bank, 2015, p. 82). 
 Tribal dispute resolution is considered to have effectively handled a range of conflicts, 
from civil, commercial, and personal status issues to criminal justice, intertribal disputes, 
and conflict mediation (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.4). These involve conflicts 
between tribes, between tribes and extractive companies, and between tribes and the 
government (Al-Dawsari (2012, p.1). Tribal mediation has worked to maintain community 
cohesion through mediation and consensus rather than coercion (Adra, 2015, p.302; 
Gledhill, 2017, p.174). Local religious leaders have also been involved in peaceful conflict 
resolution, acting as mediators in tribal areas and more traditionally nontribal urban areas 
(e.g. Aden and Taiz) (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.4).  
 Tribal tradition of dialogue: daily sessions of qat chewing have provided an important 
informal forum for socialising, conducting business, discussing current events, dispute 
mediation and religious instruction (Marc et al, 2013, p.48, 71; Bonnefoy and Poirier, 
2009, p.6). 
 Flexible and inclusive tribal organisation, has enabled “groups of varying size to 
mobilise quickly and effectively to accomplish given tasks”, enhancing communities’ 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances (Adra, 2016, p.310-311)  
There is also some discussion in the literature of the benefits of community solidarity activities 
and mutual aid culture in Yemen. For example: 
 Carapico (1998, p.132) found the cumulative economic, political, and social effect of 
local community cooperative projects from the 1970s was immense, contributing to 
the rapid modernisation and commercialisation of small towns and farm districts as well 
as state’s capacity to extend out. Everyday life was profoundly changed by the 
introduction of roads, schools, running water, electricity, and primary health care. 
 Pournik and Abu-Ismail (2011) found that rural areas had lower inequality than urban 
areas due to the importance in rural areas of traditional forms of community managed 
social solidarity arrangements. 
Challenges of social capital 
The literature highlights how in recent years – prior to the current humanitarian crisis – political, 
social and economic change were eroding social capital, changing patterns of exclusion, 
and driving conflict and political instability (Adra, 2006, p. 4, World Bank, 2016, p.2). In its 
2016 country engagement note, the World Bank (2016, p.2) found that deep-rooted structural 
drivers include: 
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 “Weak state legitimacy, authority, and capacity”. 
 “Decades of elite capture based on (co-opted) tribal structures”. 
 “Dwindling natural resources (water, oil, and cultivable and livable land) and additional 
economic pressures”. 
 “Society fragmentation (tribal, geographical, and sectarian) complicating national identity 
and prospects for a unifying vision for the state”. 
 “Political, economic, and social exclusion which has a strong spatial dimension 
contributing to the country’s fragility”. 
Analyses of changes in the social structure have identified the development of a new class 
system based on wealth and a devaluation of traditional safety nets for the poor (Adra, 2006, p.4; 
World Bank, 2006). The co-optation of customary leaders – tribal sheiks – into the formal state 
system has led to problems of loss of accountability and increased opportunity for corruption 
(Marc et al, 2013, p.5, 99-100 Adra, 2006, p.4; Lackner, 2016, p.13). With selected tribal leaders 
enjoying a new level of power and impunity, many poor people have been excluded from justice, 
security and political participation (Adra, 2006, p.4; World Bank, 2006, p.39). 
Economic changes have also had an impact on social capital. Yemen has had to contend with 
a doubling of the population, profound water shortages, alongside the impacts of the economic 
crisis. One outcome has been a rise in unemployment and an increasingly frustrated and 
disaffected youth, who have felt excluded by elites from political decision-making and economic 
opportunities (Lackner, 2016, p.13).  Research on the social impact of the economic crisis found 
“although many people reported borrowing from each other to get by, on the whole, there was a 
sense that informal social support had started to decline” (Hossain et al, 2010, p. 39). 
Back in 2006, Adra’s social exclusion analysis found that with rapid growth of towns and 
cities, many new urban residents lacked support networks and safety nets, contributing to their 
exclusion from justice, income security and services (p.4). The landless poor were particularly 
vulnerable. They were largely concentrated in squatter settlements in Yemen’s towns and cities, 
especially in the southern governorates (p.4). Meanwhile the strain of growing urban populations 
on service delivery systems led to further declining capacity to deliver services to rural areas – 
and the progressive marginalisation and exclusion of rural communities with concomitant conflict 
and security implications (p.5).  
Since the 2011 Arab spring protests, Yemen has “suffered deep insecurity” from national, 
regional and local power struggles and conflicts (Gledhill, 2017, p.175-6). With weakening 
state institutions, this has led in some areas to “a retribalisation”, while in others new, armed 
actors dominate (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2014, p.1, 11). The rise of radicalisation and the 
growth of the radical Al-Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State in Iraq and Levant 
groups has further destabilised the country (World Bank, 2016, p. 2).  
Political uncertainty, deteriorating rule of law and increased criminality has weakened 
formal and informal actors’ ability to resolve disputes and prevent conflict (Gaston and Al-
Dawsari, 2014, p.1). Hales (2010, p.4) finds a number of (anecdotal) reports of the gradual 
erosion of customary norms controlling the use of guns, an increasingly common recourse to 
arms to resolve conflicts, as well as a strong association between the proliferation of weapons 
and the rapid escalation of disputes (p.4) (see also World Bank, 2006, p.51).  
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3. Social capital during the current crisis (since 2015) 
Varied conflict experiences 
There is literature highlighting how the latest conflict is being played out in different areas of the 
country, which will impact on local social capital
12
. For example, this is illustrated by a paper on 
local governance by Adam Smith International choosing three areas undergoing different local 
challenges: Sanaa, under the control of the Houthis and their allies; Wessab, in central Yemen, 
controlled by local councils in coordination with the central government in the capital; and Aden 
in South Yemen, under the nominal control of the internationally recognised government. There 
are also reports that armed confrontations have devastated individual places, in some areas 
creating enclaves where the civilian population has limited movement and humanitarian access 
almost non-existent (e.g. in one of the main cities, Taiz) (El Rajji, 2016, p. 6). 
Multi-dimensional impact of the conflict 
There are humanitarian reports that assess the impact of the conflict since 2015. The accounts of 
the high negative impact of the conflict on all areas of life in Yemen since 2015 involve an impact 
on social resilience and cohesion, and therefore on social capital. The OCHA 2016 assessment 
found that the escalating crisis since March 2015 has “created a vast protection crisis in which 
millions face risks to their safety and basic rights, and are struggling to survive” (OCHA, 2016, 
p.3, p.5). “An estimated 18.8 million people in Yemen need some kind of humanitarian or 
protection assistance, including 10.3 million who are in acute need” (p.3). The report provides an 
assessment by district of the severity of needs, which can help show where and to what degree 
social capital is likely to be under strain. 
Impact on community self-help 
Anecdotal evidence from a Yemeni strategist reported in The Independent highlights that 
whereas Yemenis traditionally help each other through lending money and other assistance 
through friends and neighbours, the impact of the conflict means that people cannot afford to do 
this any more. Salaries have not been paid and there is no capital to lend. “It’s a cultural shift 
which is ripping at the very fabric of Yemeni society and changing how people treat each 
other.”13  However, an analyst from the International Crisis Group reporting from Sanaa relays 
her impression that while “Yemen’s social fabric has been stretched and frayed” it is “not torn 
completely. Communities are working together at the local level to feed those in need”14.  
In 2015, six months after the start of the conflict, a UNDP “Voices of Yemen” consultation in six 
governates
15
 found that, with incapacitated local authorities, community based social support – 
within and outside of families – was considered more important (UNDP, 2015). Better off 
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 See Baron (2016) for a detailed overview of the conflict characteristics at play in different areas of the country. 
13
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-saudi-arabia-civil-war-geneva-aid-summit-arms-
sales-a7702021.html  
14
 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/counter-productive-
isolation-proud-and-hungry-sanaa  
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 Sharjab Community, Taiz Governorate; Ma'een, Sho'ub and Alsab'een districts, Sana'a Governorate; Al 
Mukalla City, Hadhramout Governorate; Hajjah city, Abs and Haradh districts; Alsayani Area, Ibb Governorate; 
and Sahar, Saada Governorate. 
12 
Yemenis or immigrants were helping poor relatives while communities were using their own 
methods of conflict resolution including to deal with tensions over influxes of internally displaced 
people. The consultation reports illustrate the different needs, tensions and coping responses in 
individual communities. See the Annex for further findings for the individual communities. 
UNDP also carried out several resilience monitor assessments between August and September 
2015covering 1,152 families across six governorates
16
. Findings include: 
 Financial access: After six months of conflict informal credit remained the main source 
of financial capital for families, but it reduced from 47 per cent to 39 per cent. 13 per cent 
of households still had access to international remittances, as compared with 23 per cent 
before. (UNDP, 2016a) 
 Coping strategies: The most frequently cited coping strategy used in the last 30 days 
was to borrow food/money to buy essential items, or rely on help from friends or relatives. 
Nearly 6 per cent of families participated in community-based relief initiatives. (UNDP, 
2016b) 
A protection assessment by Oxfam, involving 96 individual respondents in Aden, Amran, Hajjah 
and Taiz
 17,
 reports that “Very few people said they receive remittances from relatives working in 
the Gulf” (Moodley, 2016, p.5). 
Social cohesion  
The conflict has affected social dynamics within communities, increasing social polarisation and 
unequal access to social safety nets (OCHA, 2016, p.40). The UNDP Resilience Monitor found 
that a majority of people interviewed in six governorates did not perceive strong solidarity within 
their community or within neighbouring communities. In Aden Governorate and Sana’a city, more 
than 30 per cent of people interviewed said they have problems among community members on 
at least one of three issues: access to livelihoods, natural resources or living spaces (UNDP, 
2016c). In its consultation exercise “Voices of Yemen”, UNDP found that most local conflicts 
stem from disputes over land and water resources (UNDP, 2015)  
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For the resilience monitors, UNDP collected data at the household level from the following governorates: 
Abyan; Aden; Hajjah; Sa’ada; Sana’a; and Taiz (UNDP, 2016a,b,c).  
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 “The Protection Assessment is an in-depth analysis of the impact of the conflict on protection needs and 
vulnerabilities. In particular this focused on the level of social cohesion, the effect on formal and informal 
protection structures, the perception of the humanitarian response and the preferred communication channels to 
the affected population. ... The sample size aimed to be as representative as possible, with 96 individual 
respondents in Aden, Amran, Hajjah and Taiz. These governorates were chosen due to the high presence of 
IDPs and conflict-affected populations combined with severe WASH, food security, livelihood and protection 
needs.” The briefing paper mentions that the report will be forthcoming in 2016 but this rapid review was not able 
to find a published version. (cited as Oxfam. (Forthcoming 2016). Understanding Affected Communities in 
Yemen. Protection Assessment. Sana'a, Yemen: Oxfam. Conducted January to May 2016.) 
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Oxfam’s protection assessment found that the majority of people said criminality had increased 
and crimes went unpunished (Moodley, 2016, p.8). The assessment found that “Higher crime 
levels exacerbate tensions and mutual distrust between displaced people and host communities, 
who often blame their new neighbours for breaches of the law” (p.8). Despite this, Oxfam’s 
protection assessment found that across all regions included in the research “relations between 
displaced people and host communities are generally sound” (Moodley, 2016, p.12). 
There is a fear that even if the war stops, because of the wide variety of local dynamics and 
grievances, revenge killings and violent disputes will continue (Al-Dawsari, 2016, p.28; UNDP, 
2015). Regional divides have been exacerbated, with most southerners claiming they want 
secession from the north, and tensions between and within local communities and tribes 
heightened (Al-Dawsari, 2016, p.3). Increasing violent sectarianism (between Sunni and Zaidi 
Shi’a Muslims, and the Sunni militant groups and Shi’a Houthis in particular), as well as the rise 
of extremist groups such as AQAP and the IS, risk impacting on post-conflict societal relations 
(Freedom House, 2016; Baron, 2016, p.7; El Rajji, 2016, p.3, 8; Al-Muslimi, 2015).  
The Oxfam protection assessment found that “Amidst the ongoing instability, armed groups are 
further entrenched as more powerful (yet unaccountable) authorities. … For instance, in northern 
governorates, communities report an increase in law and order with less kidnapping due to the 
presence of armed actors, although in the south in Aden and neighbouring governorates the 
opposite is true, with ongoing violent instability despite their presence. In areas taken over by 
extremist armed groups, ordinary Yemenis have reportedly found the new authorities more 
capable of delivering basic services, such as electricity, water and waste disposal.” (Moodley, 
2016, p.8-9) 
Impact on population groups 
The crisis is impacting population groups differently: the most vulnerable are people affected by 
displacement, women, children, minorities, and refugees and migrants (OCHA, 2016, p.15).  
Internally displaced people (IDPs): As of February 2017, the crisis had caused approximately 2 
million IDPs and 1 million IDP returnees, with the highest number residing in Hajjah, Taiz, 
Amanat, Al Asimah and Sana’a governorates (FAO, 2017). IDPs and returnees are putting strain 
on host communities already struggling to cope, increasing tensions as resources become 
scarcer (FAO, 2017; UNDP, 2015).  
Women and children: From a qualitative study by Oxfam, CARE and GenCap,
18
 Gressman 
(2016, p.3) finds overall gender relations are deteriorating, with women marginalised from 
participation in decision-making forums. Recent proliferation of externally funded Wahhabism, 
Salafi and other forms of politicised Islam threaten women’s empowerment with their 
conservative message (Adra, 2016, p.326). Women have limited mobility, and lack access to 
resources, livelihood opportunities, and protection (Alwazir et al, 2016). Women and girls face 
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 “The assessment built on CARE’s and OXFAM’s gender assessment tools and used a combined methodology 
including a secondary data review, 544 household interviews, 40 Focus Group Discussions, and 32 in-depth 
interviews with significant individuals and officials. The assessment was supplemented by case studies/stories 
collected from from participants and civil society to validate and exemplify the research findings. The 
geographical scope of the assessment included the areas in Yemen with the most severe needs - Aden, Taiz, 
Hajjah, and Abyan governorates.” (Gressman, 2016, p.3) 
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various forms of gender based violence while children continue to be killed and maimed, 
separated from families and subject to exploitation (OCHA, 2016, p.35).  
Minorities: The war has had a devastating impact on the Muhamasheen, in particular because 
the cities most affected by conflict (Aden, Taiz, and Hodeida) had large concentrations of 
Muhamasheen (El Rajji, 2016, p.13). They lack proper documentation, equal access to available 
resources, and are often made more vulnerable by being displaced to the edges of cities or 
frontlines (p.6). “Oxfam’s assessments in Aden and Hajjah highlight that the Muhamasheen and 
other marginalized groups were excluded from aid delivered by international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) or Gulf-funded charities” (Moodley, 2016, p.13). 
Refugees and migrants: “Despite the onset of the conflict, thousands of migrants continued to 
head towards Yemeni shores. From January to October 2015, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported 71,780 documented new arrivals into Yemen. Meanwhile, 
thousands have been evacuated while many remain stranded in the country.” (El Rajji, 2016, 
p.14). They do not have official documents and do not benefit from tribal or other local support 
mechanisms, leaving them vulnerable to violence and exploitation (p.14). 
Positive adaptations 
1) Women and women-led local organisations 
Oxfam and Saferworld report frequently seeing Yemeni women taking on leadership roles and 
their associated risks during the ongoing conflict, reporting that there are hundreds of women-led 
initiatives to address the effects of the conflict (Al Naami and Moodley, 2017). They identify an 
urgent need to bridge the gap between women leading peace efforts at the national and 
international levels, and those at a local level. They recommend longer-term financial, technical 
and political support for women-led grassroots organisations, as well as opportunities for women 
from a diverse range of backgrounds, and from beyond Sana’a. 
A gender and conflict analysis by Oxfam, CARE and GenCap finds that during the recent conflict 
there have been examples of “women’s coping mechanisms, resilience and ability to carve out 
spaces of agency”, in contradiction to “the predominant portrayal of Yemeni women as passive 
victims” (Gressman, 2016, p3). The report recommends nurturing “women’s increasing roles in 
distributing community-level humanitarian assistance, hygiene promotion, leading on [gender 
based violence] protection projects and facilitating women’s access to services” (p.3)  
2) Other community initiatives 
There are some reports of local communities providing a positive response during the current 
war (for example, setting up a local relief committee to respond to tensions between IDPs and 
host community in Al Mukalla City in Hadhramout – see Annex (UNDP, 2015).  
A multi-donor programme – “Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen” (ERRY) (2016-2019) – aims 
to enhance the resilience and self-reliance of crisis-affected rural communities in Abyan, Hajjah, 
Hudaydah, and Lahj Governorates
19
. Activities include equipping communities to raise 
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 http://ye.one.un.org/content/unct/yemen/en/home/what-we-do/ERRY.html  
15 
awareness of local sources of conflict and empowering them to establish sustainable conflict 
management systems. There is a focus on the most vulnerable (women, the unemployed, youth, 
the Muhamasheen, IDPs and stressed host communities). The year one progress report finds 
that from March-December 2016 completed activities included establishing or reactivating 185 
village cooperative councils, 30 water use associations and 181 community self-help initiatives 
(El Moulat, 2017, p.3-4). The security situation continues to be the main challenge to the 
programme, and its coverage does not match the extremely high number of vulnerable 
households that need resilience and livelihoods support (p.4). 
Several international organisations have issued policy recommendations to invest in local 
organisations and consult with affected people. OCHA’s 2016 assessment recommends 
providing capacity building and support so that local organisations can increase their role in the 
humanitarian response, “considerably expanding reach into difficult to access areas and 
strengthening community engagement” (p.40). Oxfam recommends (among other points) that UN 
and humanitarian agencies should establish clear mechanisms for genuine community 
participation in the delivery of humanitarian assistance at district and village level, with special 
attention given to women and marginalised groups (Moodley, 2016, p.3-4). 
3) Private sector 
An ODI report finds that since 2015 the Yemeni private sector has used its social capital and 
networks to facilitate humanitarian access, leveraging its resources and distributing assistance 
(El Taraboulsi-McCarthy et al, 2017, p. 1, 11). Local and diaspora businessmen see their 
humanitarian response as a duty informed by the Yemeni sociocultural context, which 
emphasises family and community ties, as well as Islamic precepts of charitable giving (p.10). El 
Taraboulsi-McCarthy et al (2017) advise that, despite concerns over the political bias of private 
sector actors, humanitarian actors cannot ignore their operational advantages and local know-
how (p.11). Policy recommendations for the international community and humanitarian actors 
include (among others) designing a roadmap for private sector humanitarian engagement (p.13). 
 
4. References 
Adra, N. (2006). Social exclusion analysis – Yemen. Prepared for DFID and the World Bank. 
http://www.najwaadra.net/yemense.pdf  
Adra, N. (2016). Tribal Mediation and Empowered Women: Potential Contributions of Heritage to 
National Development in Yemen. International journal of Islamic architecture, 5(2), 301-337. 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/ijia/2016/00000005/00000002/art00004?&authentic
ated=true  
Al Naami, A. & Moodley, S. (2017). We won’t wait: As war ravages Yemen, its women strive to 
build peace. Oxfam International. http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/we-wont-wait-as-
war-ravages-yemen-its-women-strive-to-build-peace-620182  
Al-Dawsari, N. (2012). Tribal governance and stability in Yemen (Vol. 24). Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribal_governance.pdf  
16 
Al-Dawsari, N. (2016). We lived Days in Hell, Civilians Perspective on the Conflict in Yemen. 
Center for Civilians in Conflict. http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pub/we-lived-days-in-hell-
civilian-perspectives-of-the-conflict-in-yemen 
Al-Iryani, L., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2015). The Yemen Social Fund for Development: An 
Effective Community-Based Approach amid Political Instability. International 
Peacekeeping, 22(4), 321-336. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1064314 
Al-Muslimi, F. (2015). How Sunni-Shia Sectarianism is Poisoning Yemen. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62375  
Aldrich, D.P. & Smith, R. (2015). Social Capital and Resilience: Informal Policy Brief for the 
World Humanitarian Summit. 
http://daldrich.weebly.com/uploads/1/5/5/0/15507740/aldrich_and_smith_social_capital_whs_policy_b
rief_version_1.1.pdf  
All Youth Network for Community Development and International Dalit Solidarity Network World 
(2012). Civil and political rights of the Al-Akhdam in Yemen. Alternative report submitted to the 
UN Human Rights Committee at its 104th session. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/YEM/INT_CCPR_NGO_YEM_104_1033
8_E.pdf  
Alwazir, A., Al-Dawsari, N., Picard, W. & Al-Shami, M. (2016). We Will Survive: Women’s Rights 
and Civic Activism in Yemen’s Endless War (WHAT THE WOMEN SAY Brief 14). ICAN. 
http://peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/What-the-Women-Say-Yemen-Winter-2016.pdf  
Ardemagni, E. (2016). Beyond the North/South narrative: Conflict and federalism in Eastern 
Yemen. LSE Middle East Centre post. Accessed online 20 June 2017. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2016/05/16/beyond-the-northsouth-narrative-conflict-and-federalism-in-
eastern-yemen/   
Baas, S. & Ali, A.O. (2005). Community-Based Organizations in Yemen: Good Practices and 
Lessons Learned. Land Reform, 2005/1. Rome: FAO Rural Institutions and Participation Service. 
www.fao.org/docrep/008/y7218t/y7218t07.htm  
Baron, A. (2016). Yemen’s Forgotten War: How Europe Can Lay the Foundations for Peace. 
European Council for Foreign Relations. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/Yemenss_forgotten_war_Final.pdf  
Baron, A., Cummings, A., Salmon, T. & al-Madhaji, M. (2016). The Essential Role of Local 
Governance in Yemen. Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and Adam Smith International.  
Sana’a Center. http://www.sanaacenter.org/files/the_essential_role_of_local_en.pdf  
Bonnefoy, L. & Poirier, M. (2009). Civil Society and Democratization in Contemporary Yemen. 
Enhancing the role of intermediary bodies. Amsterdam and The Hague: University of Amsterdam 
and Hivos. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01066200/document  
Carapico, S. (1998). Self help, social capital and state power in Carapico, S. (1998). Civil society 
in Yemen: the political economy of activism in modern Arabia. Cambridge University Press. 
(2009 online version accessed 08 June 2017). 
17 
El Moulat, A. (2017). Enhance Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY) PROGRESS REPORT: Year 
I, March 2016 – December 2016. http://ye.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/yemen/docs/unct-ye-jp-
ERRY-ANNUAL-REPORT-doc-YI-JANUARY-2017.pdf  
El Rajji, R. (2017). ‘Even war discriminates’: Yemen’s minorities, exiled at home. Minority Rights 
Group International. http://minorityrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/MRG_Brief_Yemen_Jan16.pdf  
El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, S., Majid, N. & Willitts-King, B. (2017). Private sector engagement in 
complex emergencies: case studies from Yemen and southern Somalia. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11317.pdf  
FAO (2017). GIEWS - Global Information and Early Warning System. Country Brief Yemen. 12 
April 2017. http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country/YEM/pdf/YEM.pdf  
Freedom House (2015). Freedom in the world 2015 – Yemen. Accessed online 20 June 2017. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/yemen  
Freedom House (2016). Freedom in the world 2016 – Yemen. Accessed online 20 June 2017. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/yemen  
Gaston, E.  & Al-Dawsari, N. (2014). Dispute Resolution and Justice Provision in Yemen’s 
Transition. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR345_Dispute-Resolution-and-Justice-Provision-in-
Yemen%E2%80%99s-Transition.pdf  
Gisselquist, R. M. (2015). Good Aid in Hard Places: Learning from ‘Successful’ Interventions in 
Fragile Situations. International Peacekeeping, 22(4), 283-301. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2015.1059732  
Gledhill, J. (2017). When state capacity dissolves: Explaining variation in violent conflict and 
conflict moderation. European Journal of International Security, Vol. 2(2), pp. 153–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.1  
Gressmann, W. (2016). From The Ground Up: Gender And Conflict Analysis In Yemen. Oxfam. 
http://www.carenederland.org/content/uploads/2016/11/Yemen-gender-conflict-analysis-201016-
en.pdf 
Heinze, M-C. (2016). Literature review: Women’s Role in Peace and Security in Yemen. 
Saferworld, CARPO, & YPC. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1095-womenas-
role-in-peace-and-security-in-yemen 
Hossain, N., Fillaili, R.; Lubaale, G., Mulumbi, M., Rashid, M. & Tadros, M. (2010). The Social 
Impacts of Crisis: Findings from community-level research in five developing countries. Institute 
of Development Studies, Lembaga Penelitian Smeru Research Institute, BDI Brac Development 
Institute and DFID Crisis Watch. https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/SocialImpactsofCrisisreport5.pdf  
Lackner, Helen (2016). Understanding the Yemeni crisis: the transformation of tribal roles in 
recent decades. Working Paper. University of Durham, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Studies, Durham. http://dro.dur.ac.uk/19545/1/19545.pdf  
18 
Longley Alley, A. (2017). The Counter-productive Isolation of Proud and Hungry Sanaa. 
Commentary 15 May 2017. Accessed online 20 June 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-
east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/counter-productive-isolation-proud-and-hungry-
sanaa 
Marc, A., Willman, A., Aslam, G. & Rebosio, M. with Balasuriya, K. (2013). Societal dynamics 
and fragility: Engaging societies in responding to fragile situations. Washington D.C.: World 
Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12222/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y 
Moodley, S. (2016). Picking up the pieces: What Yemenis need to rebuild their lives in a country 
torn apart by conflict. Oxfam. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bp-yemen-
picking-up-the-pieces-210916-en.pdf  
OCHA (2016). Yemen. 2017 humanitarian needs overview. UN OCHA. 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Yemen/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Final.pdf  
Osmani, S. R. (2000). Participatory governance, people's empowerment and poverty reduction. 
Social development & Poverty Elimination Division, Bureau for Development Policy, United 
Nations Development Programme. http://www.chs.ubc.ca/lprv/PDF/lprv0478.pdf  
Pournik, M., & Abu-Ismail, K. (2011). The ADCR 2011: Poverty Dynamics in Yemen as a 
Representative Arab LDC. Arab Development Challenges Background Paper 2011/13.  
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/poverty/BG_13_Poverty%20in%20Yemen.pdf 
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (2017). Yemen Country Profile. Updated March 2017. 
RMMS Horn of Africa and Yemen. Danish Refugee Council. 
http://www.regionalmms.org/images/CountryProfile/YemenCountryProfile.pdf  
Stabilisation Unit (2012). Tribes and tribalism in Yemen. A joint FCO research analysts and 
Stabilisation Unit workshop 26 April 2012 - workshop report. 
http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/523/Tribes%20and%20Tribalism%20in%20Yemen
%20-%20workshop%20report_FCO%20and%20Stabilisation%20Unit_2012.pdf  
UNDP (2015). Living in Yemen – voices of resilience. Press Release, Accessed online 22 June 
2017. http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/10/12/living-
in-yemen-voices-of-resilience-.html  
UNDP (2016a). Yemen Resilience Monitor: Communities coping with Conflict. Impact of the war 
on financial access. March 2016. Yemen: UNDP. 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/library/poverty/yemen-resilience-monitor-
communities-coping-with-con-ict.html  
UNDP (2016b). Yemen Resilience Monitor: Communities coping with Conflict. Impact of the war 
on livelihoods – coping strategies. April 2016. Yemen: UNDP. 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/library/poverty/yemen-resilience-monitor--
communities-coping-with-conflict.html  
UNDP (2016c). Yemen Resilience Monitor: Communities coping with Conflict. Impact of the war 
on social cohesion. May 2016. Yemen: UNDP. 
19 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/yemen-
resilience-monitor-communities-coping-with-con-flict.html  
U.S. Department of State (2012). Yemen 2012 international religious freedom report. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208632.pdf  
U.S. Department of State (2015). Yemen 2015 international religious freedom report. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256509.pdf  
World Bank (2006). Republic of Yemen. Country Social Analysis. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-
1168615404141/YemenCountrySocialAnalysis.pdf  
World Bank (2015). Yemen, Republic of - Unlocking the potential for economic growth. Country 
Economic Memorandum. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23660/Yemen00Republi00for0economi
c0growth.pdf?sequence=1  
World Bank (2016). International Development Association International Finance Corporation 
and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Country engagement note for the Republic of 
Yemen for the period FY17–FY18. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/458181467103791708/pdf/106118-CEN-P157686-IDA-
R2016-0175-Box396255B-OUO-9.pdf 
World Bank (2017). Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Apr. 2017). Accessed online on 20 
June 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-
remittances-data 
Acknowledgements  
We thank the following experts who voluntarily provided suggestions for relevant literature or 
other advice to the author to support the preparation of this report. The content of the report is 
the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of any of the 
experts consulted. 
 Farah Abdessamad, UNDP 
 Najwa Adra, American Institute for Yemeni Studies 
 Nadwa Al-Dawsari, independent Yemeni researcher 
 Sheila Carapico, University of Richmond 
 
  
 . 
Annex 
Social capital in communities in the UNDP “Voices of Yemen” consultations 
Excerpts in this table are copied from the individual community reports, accessed from: 
UNDP (2015). Living in Yemen – voices of resilience. Press Release, Accessed online 22 June 2017. 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/10/12/living-in-yemen-voices-of-resilience-.html  
 
Communities 
consulted 
Governate Description of community Positive adaptations of social capital Issues 
Alsayani Area Ibb  “A small community of 380 
households where youth 
compose the biggest part of 
population. Alsayani area is at 
the center of the Alsayani district, 
south of Ibb governorate. The 
community is experiencing a 
critical influx of IDPs who, like all 
Yemenis, seek a permanent 
respite from the ongoing 
challenges and conflicts.” 
“Community-based social support has strengthened as 
people cooperate more among each other in cooking, 
helping others to access water, wood, fuel, and food” 
“Community Support and Income Sources: Community social 
support is extended through active charitable initiatives which 
have developed and direct support from betteroff individuals 
to their extended family. Workers’ remittances are also one 
of the income sources for the local population” 
“People prefer to turn to informal justice mechanisms rather 
than seek assistance from formal judicial and security 
institutions due to perceived corruption of the system. - There 
is no presence of NGOs in the area. People rely on 
community support to cope with shocks. - The residents of 
Alsayani are socially divided as per their political orientations. 
The political parties are active in the area and the community 
is divided between two main parties. However, the social 
division has not reached violent levels of polarization. 
Residents believe that the airstrike campaign has fostered 
long-lasting localized conflicts.” 
“Localized conflicts: If current crisis 
continues for much longer, residents 
fear that they will not be able to cope. 
They believe that social cohesion has 
already been negatively affected.” 
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Hajjah City, Abs 
and Haradh 
Districts 
Hajjah   “coping mechanisms - Community-based social support has 
developed” 
 
“Community leaders have a limited role 
on social cohesion: It was reported that 
the roles of social, political and 
religious leaders are perceived as 
weak to strengthen social solidarity 
amongst people.” 
Al Mukalla City Hadhramout  “Al Mukalla is considered the 
most important sea port in 
Hadhramout governorate. Like 
other localities in Yemen, the 
area has been affected by the 
ongoing violence affecting all 
aspects of life. Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
seized the security vacuum and 
took over the city.”  
“Local Relief Committee: Al Mukalla residents have 
established a Local Relief Committee in response to the 
observed tensions between IDPs and locals. Many local 
NGOs and local development institutions like Al-Own 
Foundation have joined this committee. Humanitarian aid is 
channeled through the committee in charge for them to 
distribute amongst IDPs” 
“Private sector and citizen engagement: Businessmen from 
Hadhramout have contributed through NGOs to respond to 
the pressing needs of IDPs and the community. NGOs, 
institutions and charitable associations have been able to 
collect cash and in-kind contributions from citizens to support 
IDPs” 
“No localized conflicts: The area has not yet encountered or 
had any localized conflicts. Despite tensions encountered, it 
has not transformed into larger conflict as the LRC has been 
acting as mediator.” 
“Proactive community: “The positive thing is that the 
community mobilizes its available resources to support the 
poor families and IDPs, the community is proactive and did 
not wait for humanitarian assistance to arrive. This is a good 
thing, indeed!” said one of local men interviewed.” 
“Pressure on CSOs: Non-profit 
institutions and charity associations 
have declared that they can no longer 
support the communities in need. They 
are unable to serve increasing 
numbers of IDPs due to insufficient 
funding. They have not received any 
humanitarian aid for them to meet the 
pressing needs.” 
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“Community-based social support: Al Mukalla enjoys a great 
deal of social solidarity which goes beyond close family 
relations. It extends to citizens, CSOs and members of the 
business community who are uniting to provide assistance to 
those most in need” 
Ma'een, Sho'ub 
and Alsab'een 
districts 
Sana'a   “Savings, jewelry and community social assistance represent 
the main safety net options for vulnerable residents. 
Examples of community-based social support included 
exchanging goods and services (bartering), notably in old 
neighbourhoods such as those of Sho’ub and the Old City” 
“80% of support received is through family networks.” 
“70% of residents are not members of any organizations or 
social groups, and 20% receive assistance from other groups 
depending on their affiliations.” 
“The main income sources for residents of Ma’een, Sho’ub 
and Alsab’een prior to the conflict were as following: • 60% 
public and private-sector jobs, • 23% self-employment, • 3% 
remittances, • 14% community-based social support. - 89% 
of residents did not receive any public or private 
humanitarian aid.” 
 
“Vulnerability factors: Poverty, human 
and food security, collapse of service 
delivery and rising violence are 
negative factors contributing to 
increased community vulnerability. 
Ma’een, Sho’ub and Alsab’een have 
not witnessed any localized conflicts; 
however, residents are expecting 
conflicts to arise due to political 
divisions that can affect social 
cohesion. Residents wonder how long 
the conflict can last for and question 
their ability to cope.” 
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Sharjab 
Community 
Taiz  “Sharjab is a small community of 
397 families (1,042 men, 1,168 
women) where youth represent 
the highest share, the 
marginalized groups 
(Muhamasheen) amounts to 
6%.” 
“Residents in the village always cooperate to find solutions to 
their community challenges. Faced with difficulties, 
community members provide in-kind and cash support to the 
poorest families as well as deliver training to secure an 
income through improved skills. The main source of funding 
for this communitybased social support is from members’ 
donations.” 
 
Sahar district Saada “Sahar district has been one of 
the most affected areas of the 
conflict in Saada governorate. 
The district … is particularly well 
known for hosting the largest 
market in the governorate, the Al 
Talh market. Sahar has been 
called the food basket of 
Yemen.”  
“Community-based social support during these difficult times 
has been clearly observed. Residents are sharing shelter, 
giving charity and providing financial and psychological 
support.”  
opportunities: 
“Community acceptance of women participation: Women are 
actively involved in agricultural activities and, though limited 
in number, there are some women working in both the 
private and public sector.” 
“Active community-based associations: For example, the 
Alsunbolah Cooperative Agricultural Association exports 90 
percent of the agricultural products and employs hundreds of 
youth” 
 
 
 . 
Suggested citation 
Carter. B. (2017). Social capital in yemen. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
About this report 
This report is based on seven days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid 
syntheses of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific 
questions relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for 
non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any 
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and 
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing 
organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2017. 
